Check the signatures in an exported logbook
Choose the exported data file (.json) — from a backup e-mail, a receipt e-mail, a records transfer package or Logbook PDF & Export. Optionally choose aircraft-logbook-keys.json at the same time (hold ⌘ or Ctrl) to also check the service's countersigning key. Files are read on this computer only.
What “valid” means. The holder of the listed public key, using a passkey that required Face ID, Touch ID
or a passcode, signed exactly this record text for this purpose, for the web site shown, and the text has not
changed since. Which person a key belongs to was recorded by the aircraft's organization when the key was
registered; independent copies (the owner's backup e-mails and each signer's receipt e-mails) corroborate it.
Time-stamps. “Time-stamped” means an outside time-stamp authority certified that this signature already existed at that moment, so nobody — the service included — can have made it later. This page checks that the time-stamp covers the signature; to also check the authority's own signature, download the two files and run openssl ts -verify -data statement.txt -in timestamp.tsr -CAfile <authority chain>.pem.
What this file alone cannot prove. The signer's public key and the service's countersigning key are read from the file you chose, so on its own the file is self-consistent evidence: the signatures are genuine for those keys. Whose keys they are is anchored outside the file — by the published key list (aircraft-logbook-keys.json, choose it alongside), by the receipt and backup e-mails each person received when the signatures were made, and by the time-stamp authority's token. Check against those when it matters.
Time-stamps. “Time-stamped” means an outside time-stamp authority certified that this signature already existed at that moment, so nobody — the service included — can have made it later. This page checks that the time-stamp covers the signature; to also check the authority's own signature, download the two files and run openssl ts -verify -data statement.txt -in timestamp.tsr -CAfile <authority chain>.pem.
What this file alone cannot prove. The signer's public key and the service's countersigning key are read from the file you chose, so on its own the file is self-consistent evidence: the signatures are genuine for those keys. Whose keys they are is anchored outside the file — by the published key list (aircraft-logbook-keys.json, choose it alongside), by the receipt and backup e-mails each person received when the signatures were made, and by the time-stamp authority's token. Check against those when it matters.